The 8232 Project

I trust code more than politics.

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  • 8 Comments
Joined 1 year ago
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Cake day: February 25th, 2024

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  • Fedora isn’t that secure without some effort either.

    Fedora’s philosophy is being a modern and security oriented (not security focused) distro. An easy example is that Fedora uses Linux kernel 6.14.2, whereas Debian uses Linux kernel 6.1 (I know they backport fixes, but the point remains).

    Unfortunately, I have no way to confirm which one out of them is “more secure”.

    Do you have any sort of automated test framework in mind which one can use to test distros against attacks?

    Generally trust what security experts say about it, but if you really want an automated test, you can look at Lynis



  • Hey, I recognise you now!

    Look mom, I’m famous! :P

    That was a great post, I had a lot of fun reading it.

    Thank you!

    If I could follow people on Lemmy I’d follow you.

    The best you can do in regards to that is adding my profile to your preferred RSS reader, so you get notified each time I post. A few good ones for android are Feeder, Read You, or (my favorite) Capy Reader.

    What do you think about Kicksecure (and Kicksecure inside of Qubes)?

    I’m not sure if you mean actual Kicksecure or if you mean Whonix. Either way, if I were to use Qubes OS, I would do Whonix inside of Qubes (until a secureblue template is made).

    SecureBlue too but I hear SecureBlue isn’t a big team, not sure how much time they have to address the broad range of desktop Linux security issues

    secureblue backports a lot of fixes from other projects (e.g. their browser, Trivalent, backports fixes from GrapheneOS’s Vanadium). Their team is small but mighty.

    I personally think that if you were to put GrapheneOS and Qubes OS side-by-side on uncompromised hardware, I’d take Qubes.

    GrapheneOS compartmentalizes as well, but in a different fashion. All apps on GrapheneOS are sandboxed, Once GrapheneOS implements App Communication Scopes, apps will be able to be completely* isolated. Without App Communication Scopes, the best way to isolate apps is by setting up separate profiles.

    *While APC prevents communication between apps, they are still installed on the same profile, and thus have access to unique profile identifiers. Apps with network access can technically communicate with each other via a third party. Furthermore, apps may be able to directly communicate with each other through a telephone effect (e.g. Pixel Camera tells Google Play Services to tell Google Calendar about the photo you just took). I am massively oversimplifying this, but you get the gist.

    I mentioned in my post that security is going to become very interesting with the introduction of the Linux terminal into Android. If GrapheneOS chooses to expand on this, that means, like Qubes OS, GrapheneOS could emulate multiple Linux distros.

    Anyways, this is how I would rank them in terms of security (again, oversimplified):

    GrapheneOS > Qubes-secureblue > Qubes-Whonix > secureblue

    Each project fundamentally has different goals, so there is no one “security” to rank them by.

    Though, for desktop, I prefer secureblue, as I don’t have a secondary GrapheneOS device, and secureblue is far more usable than Qubes OS.